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Cyber Security Level 3: Senior IT

Most of the damage in a typical breach is done using things IT configured, or failed to configure: the flat network that let the attacker reach the file server, the Domain Admin account logged on to a helpdesk PC, the backup server joined to the domain it was meant to protect, the MFA policy with an exclusion "just for the directors". None of those are user errors. This course is for the people who build and run the estate.


Course purpose

Leave every learner able to find and close the holes in an estate they run, to recognise that the biggest risks sit inside the network and inside the IT team, and to configure Windows, Microsoft 365 and MFA so that they survive a determined attacker rather than a compliance checkbox.

Duration

  • 8 hours, delivered as 4 sessions of 2 hours
  • a defensive course: attack techniques are explained so they can be defended against, not performed

Target audience

  • infrastructure and network engineers
  • system administrators
  • service desk leads
  • IT managers who run firewalls, Windows and Active Directory, Microsoft 365, Linux servers and hypervisors

Prerequisites

Learners should already have:

  • working knowledge of networking, Windows and Active Directory, and Microsoft 365
  • Cyber Security Levels 1 and 2 are recommended

Learning outcomes

  • audit the external attack surface and design an egress policy that is actually enforced
  • run internal and external scans, prioritise on exploitability rather than score alone, and close logging gaps
  • detect and limit lateral movement, and place tripwires inside the network
  • harden the IT team itself: separate admin accounts, privileged access workstations and a safe reset procedure
  • remove name resolution poisoning, NTLM relay and legacy protocol exposure from a Windows estate
  • protect credentials, deploy LAPS, defend against Kerberos attacks and identify the real Tier 0
  • review a Microsoft 365 tenant for legacy authentication, app consent, forwarding rules, oversharing and token theft
  • design MFA and conditional access properly, including registration, reset and break-glass accounts
  • see what the IT team leaks, and stop it
  • isolate network, application and data, with backups ransomware cannot reach
  • run the first hour of an incident response, including out-of-band communications and reporting

Detailed module structure

Unit 1: Plugging the holes: perimeter, egress and attack surface

Topics:

  • the attacker's view of your network
  • default-deny inbound
  • egress filtering: the half everyone skips
  • web proxying and DNS filtering
  • reducing the exposed attack surface
  • VPN versus exposed services
  • labs: external attack surface audit, and design and test an egress policy

Unit 2: Finding the holes: scanning, patching and logging

Topics:

  • you cannot defend what you have not found
  • external and internal scanning
  • prioritisation: CVSS is not your priority list
  • patching cadence
  • logging: if it is not logged, it did not happen
  • labs: internal scan and triage, and logging gap analysis

Unit 3: Look inwards: the threat is already inside

Topics:

  • why the inside matters more
  • types of insider
  • how lateral movement works
  • east-west traffic visibility and control
  • internal scanning and deception
  • monitoring admin activity
  • labs: can a workstation reach another workstation, and privileged and stale account audit with a tripwire

Unit 4: People, including the IT team

Topics:

  • the biggest risk on any network
  • how IT teams make themselves the easy target
  • separate admin accounts
  • privileged access workstations
  • the service desk is an attack surface
  • remote support tools as a social engineering channel
  • building a team that challenges
  • labs: rewrite the password and MFA reset procedure, and admin account hygiene audit

Unit 5: Windows I: name resolution, NTLM, relay and legacy protocols

Topics:

  • why Windows defaults hurt
  • LLMNR, NBT-NS and mDNS poisoning
  • WPAD and IPv6 auto-configuration
  • NTLM and relay
  • SMBv1
  • other legacy protocols and settings
  • lab: name resolution and relay exposure audit

Unit 6: Windows II: credentials, Kerberos, tiering and Group Policy

Topics:

  • where credentials live, and protecting LSASS and cached credentials
  • local administrator reuse and LAPS
  • Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting and delegation
  • macros and Office, PowerShell and RDP
  • Active Directory tiering
  • Group Policy hygiene and AD persistence
  • labs: credential exposure audit, and find your real Tier 0

Unit 7: Microsoft 365 and other cloud ecosystems

Topics:

  • your tenant is a domain controller on the internet
  • legacy authentication
  • OAuth application consent
  • mailbox forwarding and inbox rules
  • guest access, SharePoint and OneDrive oversharing, and Teams external access
  • token theft
  • audit logging and the licensing gap
  • Google Workspace and other ecosystems
  • labs: business email compromise sweep, and tenant posture review

Unit 8: MFA done properly

Topics:

  • what MFA does and does not stop
  • adversary-in-the-middle: why push and codes are not enough
  • where the default configurations fall short
  • ranking the methods, and the right design
  • a conditional access baseline
  • device compliance, token protection and session lifetime
  • hardening registration and reset
  • break-glass accounts done properly
  • MFA beyond Microsoft 365
  • labs: MFA reality check, and design the rollout

Unit 9: Stranger danger and accidental disclosure

Topics:

  • what IT leaks
  • forums, communities and vendor tickets
  • screenshots
  • AI tools and pastebins
  • public Git repositories and secrets
  • vendors and third parties on remote sessions
  • email mistakes: autocomplete, hidden data and wrong recipients
  • DNS, certificates and what you publish
  • the IT team as a target
  • lab: look at yourself the way an attacker would

Unit 10: Isolation: network, application and data

Topics:

  • assume breach, limit the blast radius
  • network segmentation
  • application isolation
  • data isolation: backups ransomware cannot reach
  • recovery isolation
  • labs: draw the zones and find the flat paths, and backup attack tabletop

Unit 11: Real social engineering attacks, dissected

Topics:

  • how to read a published case
  • supplier and supply chain compromise
  • phone spear-phishing of staff
  • MFA fatigue and synced codes
  • help desk impersonation, from a single call to attacks at scale
  • the deepfake video call
  • the pattern behind them all
  • lab: map the cases to your estate

Unit 12: Incident response for IT: the first hour and beyond

Topics:

  • prepare before it happens
  • the first hour
  • containment and evidence in practice
  • out-of-band communications
  • when to call in an incident response firm
  • reporting to the ICO and others
  • recovery and lessons learned
  • lab: tabletop, Friday afternoon

Assessment: audit, respond and defend

An open book assessment in three parts:

  • a practical audit of five exhibits of real-style output: identify the findings, rank them and give the fix
  • a written response to a developing compromise
  • a knowledge check of 20 short questions

The pass mark is 70% overall, and the top-priority finding in every audit exhibit must be identified. A long list of minor findings does not make up for missing the critical one.

Close the holes, look inwards, assume breach

Ideal for IT teams who build and run the estate the attacker will walk through

Training scope and tailoring

The training plan shown above is provided as a structured guide to the typical scope and direction of the course. Our training content is reviewed and refined over time, so the precise balance of modules, examples and exercises may vary when the course is delivered.

Where there are specific topics, technologies or operational outcomes that are particularly important to your team, these can normally be incorporated into the delivery plan by prior agreement. Training is not treated as a rigid, fixed package; it is adapted where appropriate to reflect the client environment, delegate experience level, group size and the objectives agreed in advance.